France's Energy Strategy: How Does Prioritizing Nuclear Power Reshape the Logic of Economic Growth?

France stands at an energy strategy crossroads. In 2026, Paris successively released the third edition of the National Low-Carbon Strategy (SNBC-3) and the third edition of the Multi-Year Energy Plan (PPE 3), setting the tone for the path of economic decarbonization through 2035. But the defining feature of this roadmap is not an acceleration of renewables, but a firmer bet on nuclear power. For observers of the French economy, this is not merely a contest between technologies, but a structural choice concerning national competitiveness, the industrial future, and Europe's role.

France is the economy with the highest reliance on nuclear power in the world. Around 68% of its electricity comes from 57 reactors in operation, and it plans to build 6 to 14 new units. This path dependence dates back to the oil crisis of the 1970s, and has now been given new strategic significance under climate neutrality goals. Yet the facts also show that France's greenhouse gas emissions fell by only 1.6% in 2025, far below the average annual decline of 4.6% needed to meet its 2030 targets; the pace of wind and solar expansion is notably slow within the EU, and France even failed to meet mandatory EU targets in 2020 and 2022, refusing to pay the corresponding fines.

Why does France, on the one hand, commit to climate neutrality, while on the other hand slowing the growth of renewable electricity? The answer lies in economic logic. Nuclear power provides stable, low-carbon base-load electricity at relatively controllable prices, which is key for energy-intensive manufacturing industries (such as aluminum, chemicals, and the automotive value chain) to maintain international competitiveness. Against the backdrop of Germany's gradual nuclear phase-out and heightened electricity price volatility in Europe, French nuclear power keeps domestic wholesale electricity prices low, indirectly subsidizing the industrial sector. This combination of "low electricity prices + low carbon" is regarded by Paris as the cornerstone of reindustrialization. Through building new nuclear plants and expanding the grid, the French government hopes to turn electricity into a strategic export product, thereby strengthening its central position in the European electricity market.

But the nuclear-first approach is not without costs. First, EDF (Électricité de France) faces uncertainty in its long-term financing capacity. Cost overruns and schedule delays have become the norm for new EPR reactor construction; the Flamanville EPR completed its start-up tests in April 2026, but it is more than a decade behind the original schedule. The massive investment will crowd out public funds for smart grid and energy storage systems, which are precisely the necessary supporting infrastructure for the large-scale integration of renewables into the grid. Second, the slow deployment of renewables means France may lose market share in rapidly growing green industries, such as photovoltaics, wind power, batteries, and critical mineral processing. The EU as a whole is advancing a green industrial plan; if France relies too heavily on nuclear power, it may fall behind Germany and the Nordic countries along the "green technology value chain." Third, the latest forecasts from RTE (the grid operator) indicate that, due to downward revisions in electricity consumption growth expectations, France may face a temporary "electricity surplus" risk by 2035. This is not a good thing: surplus means a large amount of capital is sunk into power generation assets, while there is not enough end-use demand (such as electric vehicles and heat pumps) to absorb it, which could lead to lower electricity prices and deteriorating investment returns.Looking deeper, this strategic choice reflects the unique logic of the French economic model: state dominance, core enterprises taking the lead, and "French champions" prioritized. Nuclear power is controlled by the state-owned enterprise EDF, which is consistent with France's long-standing centralist industrial policy. However, this model collides with the increasingly market-oriented energy transition path within the EU. France actively lobbies to include nuclear power in the EU's low-carbon taxonomy, standing in stark opposition to anti-nuclear countries such as Germany. In the next decade, the "energy model divergence" between France and Germany may hinder the reform of the EU's unified electricity market, the implementation efficiency of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, and even affect the overall progress of the European Green Deal.

For French companies, nuclear-first means short-term security of electricity supply and cost advantages, but in the long run they will face pressure from green procurement demands. International customers and financial institutions are increasingly paying attention to supply chain carbon footprints and the proportion of renewable energy used. Countries that rely primarily on nuclear power may be treated differently under global ESG frameworks (even though nuclear power itself has very low carbon emissions). France's export-oriented industries such as automotive, luxury goods, and aviation need to prove their "low-carbon credentials" under increasingly stringent green trade standards. Whether the nuclear policy can gain international recognition will be a key factor.

Looking ahead 3 to 10 years, France will face three key tests: First, can new nuclear projects be completed on time and within budget? If delayed again, France may be forced to extend the use of fossil fuels, thereby deviating from the 2050 carbon neutrality target. Second, how can France avoid systematically crowding out renewable energy investment while promoting nuclear power? The EU level is likely to continue to pressure France to fulfill its binding renewable energy targets. Third, can France find a balance between electricity surplus and insufficient electrification? This requires accelerating electrification in building heating, transportation, and industry; otherwise, the advantages of nuclear power will not be translated into actual economic benefits.

The evolution of France's energy strategy is in essence a microcosm of its repositioning within globalization and European integration. Whether nuclear power, as a "strategic asset," can help France achieve the triple goals of reindustrialization, green exports, and European influence remains highly uncertain. But what is certain is that France's choices will directly affect the European energy landscape and provide other countries with a transition paradigm different from Germany's "renewables plus natural gas" model. The future French economy will redefine the boundaries of its competitiveness amid this long-term tension between nuclear power and green electricity.

Source: Clean Energy Wire, "CLEW Guide – France caught between national and European energy ambitions", https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/clew-guide-france-moves-action-new-climate-plan-green-industry-makeover